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Rethinking bank business models: the role of intangibles 
 
Lei Chen, Jo Danbolt, and John Holland 
 
 
Purpose: 
This paper provides a new way of rethinking banking models by using qualitative 
research on intangibles.  
 
This is required because the banking sector has been transformed significantly by the 
changing environment over the past two decades. The 2007-2009 financial crisis also 
added to concerns about existing bank business models. 
 
Design/Methodology approach: 
Using qualitative data collected from interviews with bank managers and analysts in 
the UK, this paper develops a grounded theory of bank intangibles. 
 
Findings: 
The model reveals how intangibles and tangible/financial resources interact in the 
bank value creation process, how they actively respond to environmental changes, 
how bank intangibles are understood by external observers such as analysts, and how 
bankers and analysts differ in their views. 
 
Research implications: 
Grounded theory provides the means to further develop bank models as business 
models and theoretical models. This provides the means to think beyond conventional 
finance constructs and to relate bank models to a wider theoretical literature 
concerning intellectual capital, organisational and social systems theory, and 
‘performativity’. 
 
Practical implications: 
Such development of bank models and of a systems perspective is critical to the 
understanding of banks by bankers, by observers and for their ‘critical and reflexive 
performativity’. It also has implications for systemic risk and bank regulation. 
 
Social implications: 
Improvement in bank models and their use in open and transparent processes are key 
means to improve public accountability of banks. 
 
Originality: 
The paper reveals the core role of intellectual capital (IC) in banks, in markets, and in 
developing theory and research at firm and system levels.  
 
Key words: bank models, knowledge, intermediation, external observers, systems.  
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1. Introduction  
Banks play an important role in resource allocation by transferring funds from 
those in surplus (depositors) to those in deficit (borrowers) (Berger et al., 2010). 
Traditional theoretical models of banks as financial intermediaries indicate that they 
help in reducing the friction of transaction costs (e.g., Benston and Smith, 1976) and 
information asymmetry by acting as delegated monitors between lenders and 
borrowers (e.g., Diamond, 1984). 
In recent years, banking systems have experienced significant transformations 
driven by deregulation, technological change and the globalisation of goods and 
financial markets (Berger et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2010), and bank activities have 
been largely altered as well. The importance of the conventional functions of taking 
deposits and making loans for banks has been reduced. Banks now tend to perform 
more sophisticated functions in the modern economy, such as risk management 
(Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000), and have developed various business models in 
response to the increasing competition. According to IIRC (2011:1), business model is 
defined as “the organization’s chosen system of inputs, business activities, outputs 
and outcomes that aims to create value over the short, medium and long term”. In 
these terms, bank business models consist of many integrated, interacting elements 
designed for value creation and matched to their competitive environment (Porter, 
1985). These bank business models seemed to work well, at least until the middle of 
2007. However, the financial crisis that occurred in 2007 has led to academics and 
policy makers expressing concerns about the new banking business models. Wilson et 
al. (2010: 154) suggest that it is necessary to re-examine “the scale, scope, governance, 
performance and the safety and soundness of financial institutions”.  
There has been a large amount of research investigating how bank-specific, 
industry-specific and macroeconomic factors may have impact on bank performance 
(e.g., Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). However, the 
literature on bank strategies and performance appears to be somewhat limited, as it 
focuses heavily on tangible or financial resources in banks. The world economy has 
moved from an industrial economy to a knowledge-driven economy (Meritum, 2002), 
and wealth and growth are now “driven primarily by intangible (intellectual) assets” 
(Lev, 2001: 1). As an intellectually intensive sector, intangibles tend to be extremely 
important for banks.  
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Against this background, we conduct a qualitative study investigating how 
intangibles affect bank intermediation, value creation, and performance. We explore 
how banks use their understanding of intangibles to improve information disclosure to 
the market, and how analysts understand and use this information in different ways.  
We offer suggestions as to how bank business models and the role of bank intangibles 
should be rethought. 
 This paper makes contributions to both the banking and intangibles literatures. 
First, distinct from the majority of empirical research that has looked at the impacts of 
tangible or financial assets on bank performance, this paper adopts a wider approach 
to the investigation of banks’ value creation processes by taking into consideration 
both intangibles and tangibles. The grounded theory generated from interview data 
offers insights into the value creation process in banks, showing how the integration 
of intangible resources and tangible/financial resources provides the means to 
improve financial and information intermediation processes as well as risk 
management in banks. It is also helpful in facilitating ways for bank managers to 
measure and manage their intangibles more effectively. In this sense, this research 
provides novel ideas on how bank business models can be improved. Second, the 
above provides the means to explore how theoretical models of banks can be further 
developed to include more explicit ideas of intangibles in intermediation, in resolving 
information problems and in risk management. 
Third, the extant literature on intangibles focuses on the investigation of either 
organisation managers’ perspectives or the capital market actors’, and empirical 
evidence on the latter tends to be embryonic. This paper contributes to the literature 
by exploring the perceptions of both bank managers and analysts on intangibles 
measurement, disclosure and modelling. By so doing, we are likely to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of intangibles than previous research, and are able to show the 
communication gap between these two groups of people. The bank and analyst nexus 
and issues of bank intellectual capital (IC) and value creation are discussed within the 
wider network of the ‘market for information’. The latter is interpreted within the 
actor-network theory (Latour, 1993) and Henningsson’s (2009) insights into the social 
forces effecting actors in financial markets. The performative role (Mackenzie and 
Millo, 2003) of bank models (business and theoretical) and other knowledge 
constructs in the information market network is also recognised. This view and the 
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need for wider shared understanding of banks, places the empirical findings and the 
call for new bank models in a novel theoretical context. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two provides a review 
of relevant theory and literature. Section Three outlines the data collection and data 
analysis processes of the paper and the empirical results are presented in Section Four. 
Section Five discusses the implications of the findings for existing bank models and 
for observers in external markets. Finally, the conclusions are discussed in Section Six. 
 
2. Theory and literature review  
While both tangible and intangible resources can be potential strategic assets, 
empirical research shows that tangible resources are transparent and relatively easily 
duplicated, and intangible resources1 are normally the key strategic resources in a firm 
(e.g., Fahy, 2000). Intellectual capital (IC) is commonly categorised into human 
capital (HC), structural capital (SC) and relational capital (RC) (Meritum, 2002), and 
the three components of corporate knowledge are expected to interact with each other 
and then contribute to a firm’s superior performance (Reed et al., 2006). However, 
empirical evidence of relationships among different intangible elements and between 
them and firm performance tends to be limited. Because of the inherent 
unobservability of intangibles, it is difficult to measure them in quantitative terms and 
compare them across companies. Consequently, the level of intangible disclosure 
across countries or sectors tends to be very low (Beattie and Thomson, 2007), and the 
remaining information asymmetry related to intangibles is still high (Holland, 2009).  
Because of the problems with intangible measurement and disclosure, quantitative 
research tends to be limited. There have been calls for more quantitative evidence of 
modelling intangibles, as research on intangibles has to be improved by testing (Marr 
et al., 2003). However, this research notes that apart from problems with intangible 
measurement and disclosure, the complexity of the value creation model of 
intangibles also prevents academics from providing quantitative empirical evidence of 
the impact of intangibles on firm performance.   
                                                 
1  Although the intangibles literature has developed over several decades, research dealing with 
intangibles suffers from a fundamental problem, which is the lack of common terminology (Kristandl 
and Bontis, 2007). Different terms have been used in reference to intangible assets, such as intangibles, 
intellectual capital or knowledge assets (Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Lev, 2001). In this paper, 
following Lev’s (2001) and Meritum’s (2002) argument, the terms intangible resources, intangibles 
and intellectual capital are used interchangeably. 
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Some researchers have tried to explore the interactions between different intangible 
elements and bank performance by conducting qualitative case studies (e.g., 
Cuganesan, 2005; Holland, 2004; Johanson et al., 2001; Murthy and Mouritsen, 2011). 
Their findings show that there are various forms of interactions and transformations 
among different elements of intangibles rather than simple linear cause-and-effect 
relations between individual intangible elements and performance. For example, 
Cuganesan (2005) finds that different components of intangibles transform each other 
often in a pluralistic and fluid manner in a financial firm. 
The complexity of the value creation model of intangibles is reflected in not only 
the interrelationships among different intangible components, but also their 
interactions with tangible or financial assets. Murthy and Mouritsen (2011) argue that 
IC in the form of competences is based on complementarities between bank HC, SC 
and RC, and only exists during their joint performance. They explore the relationship 
between IC elements and financial capital via an interview-based case study in a bank, 
and find that financial capital is not only an effect but also an important input for IC, 
because IC has to be developed through the firm’s budgeting process, and the budget 
may reduce the relationships between IC elements. 
It can be seen that the value creation process of intangibles is complex and dynamic, 
and a better understanding of the relationships among intangible elements and 
between them and firm performance will help researchers to model intangibles in 
bank business models in a more appropriate way. This paper recognises the need for 
more qualitative research to complement the proposed quantitative work. Generation 
of grounded theory is one means to advance research on both qualitative and 
quantitative dimensions of value creation, hence providing a more adaptive and 
flexible conceptual frame for bank decision makers and external observers. 
Especially, this paper argues that there is scope for in-depth qualitative empirical 
research in this regard in the banking sector. The banking sector is chosen as the 
research context because of the importance of intangibles to banks’ business model 
and limited literature on banks’ knowledge based intangibles. 
Over the past several decades, the banking sector experienced major changes, such 
as deregulation, technological development, and globalisation, which dramatically 
altered banks’ competitive environment. Enhanced competition has forced banks to 
explore resources that could lead to business success. In the banking sector, where 
banks provide similar financial intermediation and payment services, and where 
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publicly observable bank products have the characteristics of being easy to copy and 
lacking in adequate patent protection (Watkins, 2000), intangibles tend to be 
fundamental to creating competitive advantage for banks. 
However, literature on how well the bank business model is run has focused 
heavily on tangible or financial resources in banks such as capital and bank size (e.g., 
Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011), but paid little attention to 
the investigation of how banks exploit their intangible resources in a knowledge-
driven economy, with the exception of Holland (2010). 
Holland (2010) discusses the central role of IC or knowledge based intangible 
resources in banking, where IC comprised three elements: HC, SC and RC (Meritum, 
2002; Mouritsen et al., 2002). Knowledge based intangibles and their impact on 
tangibles (especially intermediation mechanisms and financial resources) are the 
primary source of sustainable competitive advantage in banking.  A bank’s 
sustainable competitive advantage comes from not only strategic resources that the 
bank has, but also dynamic capabilities that adapt to the changing environment (e.g., 
Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997).  
Moreover, previous interview-based case studies that investigated how 
organisations measured, managed and reported intangibles tend to focus either on 
internal managers’ perspectives (e.g., Beattie and Thomson, 2010; Johanson et al., 
2001) or market actors’ perspectives (e.g., Abhayawansa, and Abeysekera, 2009; 
Abhayawansa and Guthrie, 2012; Campbell and Slack, 2008; Henningsson, 2009; 
Holland, 2006; and Holland et al., 2012), and evidence on the capital market actors’ 
perspectives on intangibles is embryonic. 
Holland’s (2006) study provides evidence of the importance of intangible 
information to capital market actors. He finds that fund managers faced major 
problems in their investment decisions because of the increasing importance of 
company intangibles to share price, and the limitations of public information. They 
used private meetings with company management to obtain information about 
intangibles and to understand the dynamic connections between intangible variables 
in the value creation process.  
However, Campbell and Slack’s (2008) findings contradict this. Campbell and 
Slack (2008) explore the usefulness and materiality of annual report narrative 
disclosure in the UK, with particular reference to the banking sector. They observe 
 7 
that the narrative parts of annual reports that normally contain information about 
banks’ intangibles tend to be relatively unimportant to analysts. 
Abhayawansa and Abeysekera (2009) investigate IC disclosure by sell-side analysts. 
They noted that IC information disclosed by analysts cannot be taken at face value. 
Using an original theoretical framework, they argue that issues of signalling, analysts’ 
incentives/influences, political economy view and globalisation have to be employed 
to explain IC disclosure in sell-side analysts’ reports. Abhayawansa and Guthrie 
(2012: 398) develop these ideas further using an “impression management” frame. 
Noting conflicting interests facing analysts and the relative amenability of IC 
information, they find that analysts used IC information to manage perceptions. 
Analysts used IC information to “subdue the pessimism associated with an 
unfavourable recommendation, increase credibility of favourable recommendations 
and distinguish sell from hold recommendations” (Abhayawansa and Guthrie, 2012: 
398). 
This paper aims to investigate the role of intangibles in the bank business model 
using interviews with both bank managers and analysts. We explore the variation in 
views on intangibles from different groups of people, thus providing a more 
comprehensive picture of the role of intangibles than previous interview-based case 
studies. In particular, we are interested in how different intangibles interact with each 
other and integrate with tangible or financial assets in value creation, in 
intermediation, and performance in banks. We are interested in how banks use this 
enhanced understanding of intangibles to improve information disclosure to the 
market, and how analysts understand and use this information in the same or different 
ways. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
Given the research purpose of investigating the role of intangibles in the bank 
business model, senior managers (e.g., CEOs, CFOs or directors of retail or 
commercial banking) in UK financial institutions, as well as analysts who specialise 
in the banking sector, were targeted for interviews. Senior level managers were 
considered to be those who had broad knowledge about their organisation’s strategies, 
policies and business practices, and were expected to understand the research problem 
better than low level management and employees. Similarly, analysts who specialise 
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in the banking sector were chosen to be another set of interviewees on the grounds 
that they were considered to be experts with specialist knowledge and understanding 
of bank valuation. 
The fieldwork was undertaken between June 2008 and September 2009, during 
which time the global financial crisis occurred. It should be noted that, although the 
financial crisis created difficulties in accessing the targeted interviewees, it was 
helpful to the research because managers and analysts could reflect on how 
intangibles played a role in bank performance and value under quite different 
circumstances. This stimulated ‘theoretical sensitivity’ and the search for variation in 
core concepts.  
Twelve interviews with bank analysts and eleven interviews with senior managers 
in financial institutions were conducted. The majority were one-to-one interviews, 
with the exception of one interview in which two bank managers participated. The 
interviews lasted from fifteen minutes to one hour and twenty minutes. Six were 
telephone interviews, while all others were face-to-face interviews conducted at the 
case organisations. With the interviewees’ permission, eighteen interviews were 
audio-recorded and then transcribed carefully in order to provide a basis for reliable 
data analysis.  
The interview questions were designed to be semi-structured in order to encourage 
participants to talk freely and openly about their opinions and experience. Interview 
guides were constructed based on four specific questions: 
 What may be the important intangibles for a bank? 
 How do they relate to bank performance? 
 How can these intangibles be measured? 
 How have these intangibles been reported? 
 The interview guides served as a reminder and were used flexibly to probe issues 
such as interactions between intangibles. After each interview, the researchers 
reviewed the interview process, and revised the interview guides based on gained 
information. Notes were taken by the researchers during each interview, regardless of 
whether it was recorded or not. The transcripts or notes of the interviews were sent 
back to the participants to get their feedback and to check the accuracy of the data.  
 
3.2 Data analysis 
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The interview data was processed by adopting a grounded theory method, using “a 
systematic set of procedures to develop and inductively derive grounded theory about 
a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 24). Combining this technique with a case 
study has the potential to strengthen case analysis by searching for patterns through 
cross-case analysis (Parker and Roffey, 1997). Moreover, the clearly specified 
operational procedures of grounded theory data analysis can enhance construct 
validity of a qualitative study (Pandit, 1996). 
Based on previous work by, among others, Beattie et al. (2001), Locke (2001), 
Parker and Roffey (1997) and Strauss and Corbin (1998), the interview data was 
analysed through five stages: familiarisation, reflection, open coding, axial coding and 
selective coding. All the case data was manually analysed due to the consideration 
that grounded theory is an “interpretive process” (Suddaby, 2006: 638) between the 
researcher and the data, and the researchers’ theoretical sensitivity tended to be very 
important in all stages. Enhanced theoretical sensitivity helped the researchers to 
challenge their existing assumptions and knowledge structure and move from 
description to theoretical analysis.  
As the initial stage of data analysis, familiarisation with interview data started in 
the data collection process. The researchers transcribed each interview immediately 
after it was conducted and generated a record of ‘big ideas’ or tentative broad concept 
categories for each interview. At the stage of reflection, the researchers undertook 
some preliminary cross-case analyses by comparing and critically evaluating 
individual case data with other cases as well as previous literature. Similarities and 
differences among some important issues were grasped, and were recorded in 
theoretical memos. Memos that recorded the researchers’ early thoughts, memories 
and reflections with the case data (such as code notes of ‘big ideas’ and theoretical 
memos) facilitated further systematic coding, and were continuously used throughout 
the entire process of data analysis. 
Subsequent to the reflection stage, the researchers went through each case interview 
line by line in the open coding stage. The transcripts and notes were read carefully in 
order to find key words or phrases, and names or labels were given to them. Then a 
code card was constructed, and the labelled code was written on it. Once the same 
concept was identified in other case interviews, it was added to the earlier constructed 
code card, with the case number and page number being indicated. Then concepts 
with similar characteristics were grouped to develop categories and subcategories. 
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Corresponding to the literature on intellectual capital, four main categories related to 
intangibles were identified in this process, namely ‘top management human capital 
(HC)’, ‘employee level human capital (HC)’, ‘structural capital (SC)’ and ‘relational 
capital (RC)’. 
Axial coding is the process of establishing linkages among categories and 
subcategories (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The technique of constant comparison was 
used in order to test the established relationships against data. Specifically, the 
linkages among concepts and the four main categories were identified, and a new, 
large category was formed, namely ‘interactions’. This macro category was further 
developed into three core codes: ‘intra-category interactions’, ‘cross-category 
interactions’ and ‘network interactions’. It should be noted that although axial coding 
differs from open coding in terms of purpose and procedure, they sometimes 
happened contemporaneously in this study. 
In the final step of selective coding, the focal core code, that is, the central category 
for theory integration (Parker and Roffey, 1997), was selected, and other categories 
were linked to it. In this case, the core category was the macro category of 
‘interactions’ developed in the axial coding process. Surrounding it, other major 
codes were grouped into two broad conceptual categories: ‘conditions’ and 
‘consequences’. By linking those categories to the central category, a theoretical 
framework of banking intangibles was developed. 
 
4. Empirical results: a grounded theory of bank intangibles 
4.1 Overview of the grounded theory of bank intangibles 
The grounded theory of bank intangibles was developed from case interviews with 
both bank managers and analysts. Similarities and differences in bank managers’ and 
analysts’ views on intangibles, were rich and valuable information sources about the 
role of intangibles in the bank business model and in the development of a grounded 
theory of bank intangibles. The latter revealed that under certain conditions, 
intangibles integrated with other types of resources through three different levels, 
namely intra-category interactions, cross-category interactions and network 
interactions, and then affected institution performance and information disclosure. 
Figure 1 presents the overall grounded theory of bank intangibles.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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It can be seen from Figure 1 that the combinations and interactions of intangibles 
and tangibles formed the core of the grounded theory. Tangibles provided the 
foundation upon which intangibles, as the key sources of competitive advantage, 
could have an impact. The interactions among intangibles could be either intra-
category interactions or cross-category interactions. The former occurred between 
intangibles in the same category, while the latter were interactions among intangibles 
in different categories. The intangibles affected tangibles and created value through 
the process of internal bank network interactions, such as reducing transaction costs, 
improving the intermediation process and risk management. Such combinations and 
interactions of resources finally affected the financial performance, value and 
information disclosure of the financial institution, as indicated under ‘consequences’ 
on the right of the flowchart. Table 1 provides some examples of interactions 
identified in the case data. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
All the above combinations and interactions of intangibles and tangibles were 
adjusted under certain conditions. Those conditions, as presented on the left side of 
Figure 1, included multiple (and possibly interacting) causal conditions and contextual 
conditions. Causal conditions that were mediated by contextual conditions continued 
to influence the role of intangibles in the bank value creation process.  
In addition, it was found that the value creation process was an ongoing feedback 
and learning process for the case institutions, as shown at the bottom of the picture. 
Top management in the case institutions continued to learn from broad interactions of 
conditions, intangibles, tangibles and consequences. They gained experience and 
knowledge in identifying and developing key sources of competitive advantage and 
setting up coherent strategies to search for the appropriate combination of intangibles 
and tangibles in response to conditional changes. These findings provide evidence in 
support of the argument of dynamic capabilities, which suggests that resources and 
dynamic capabilities are closely interlinked in exploring firm competitive advantage 
(Teece, 2007).  
The learning and changes in the bank were also drivers for learning by analysts 
about bank IC and its changing role in bank value creation and value. This revealed a 
longer term dynamic dimension to grounded theory, both in the bank and in its 
external network. 
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The key interactions and combinations included intra IC category interactions, the 
inter IC category interactions, internal firm network interactions, the contingent nature 
of the IC combinations relative to external change, the special combinations for 
business segments, and the feedback and learning leading to new IC. These 
interactions and combinations show elements of linearity, non-linearity (two-way and 
multiple causality), variety and transience in the interactions between different 
intangible elements and bank performance. This is consistent with prior work by 
Johanson et al. (2001), Holland (2004), Cuganesan (2005) and Murthy and Mouritsen 
(2011). These interrelationships were more complicated and dynamic than simple 
linear models. However, these findings were consistent across the case banks, 
revealing the potential for further development of bank models. In particular, it 
revealed the potential (as discussed in section 5 below) for developing theoretical 
models by using empirical findings such as the grounded theory, IC literature, and 
Weick’s (1979) view of organisations as interactive systems, to adapt conventional 
financial concepts of banks. 
 
4.2 Conditions 
Corresponding to grounded theory terms, conditions in this study included causal 
and contextual conditions. The causal conditions were changes in the external 
environment, including changes in the economic environment (e.g., financial crisis) 
and in the banking industry (e.g., business globalisation and technology development). 
Contextual conditions consisted of the industry context (e.g., industry characteristics 
and business segment characteristics), regulatory and standard setting, and special 
conditions such as merger and acquisition (M&A) activity.  
Almost all the interviewees, both analysts and managers, discussed how changes in 
the economic environment influenced the role of intangibles in the financial 
institutions. Ongoing economic change, especially the global financial crisis in 2007-
2009, not only influenced financial institution strategies in terms of making use of the 
interactions among intangibles, but also changed the market perception with respect to 
understanding intangibles in the banking sector. For example, customer relationships 
were argued to be a core intangible element for many case institutions. Good 
customer relationships became even more important during the financial crisis in 
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terms of helping banks to maintain and further increase their customer deposits and 
capital. As analyst A52 argued, 
“[N]ow when all the consumers and general public are very nervous about 
their bank, I think it becomes more important than ever that you have a strong 
customer franchise.”      
 
Changes in the banking industry also influenced the elements of intangibles and 
institutions’ strategies for them. Technology development has significantly changed 
the competitive environment in which banks operate. New technology created 
opportunities for them to reduce costs and deliver products and services through 
different channels, and for improved intangible management. On the other hand, 
technology development provided more choices to customers in terms of bank 
products and services, and hence increased the difficulty of maintaining customer 
relationships for banks. Moreover, business globalisation was also an important factor 
that drove the interactions among intangibles in the case institutions. The 
globalisation of banking endowed some intangible elements with new meanings. For 
example, manager B7 argued that the consistency of the brand in different countries 
became an important intangible for them. 
Contextual conditions refer to the general conditions within which the interactions 
take place (Dey, 1999). A variety of contextual conditions have been identified from 
the case data; among them, the industry context, which includes various industry 
characteristics and business segment characteristics, was mentioned by most 
interviewees. For instance, customer inertia was argued to be an important factor 
affecting customer relationship management 3 . On the one hand, customer inertia 
made it easy for the case banks to retain existing customers. On the other hand, 
customer inertia was an obstacle to attracting new customers. Analyst A3 mentioned 
that as there was so much customer inertia in the UK banking sector, even if a bank 
provided very attractive current account offer, it was difficult for it to increase market 
share.  
Apart from industry characteristics, characteristics of business segments were 
suggested to also be contextual conditions that influenced intangibles in terms of the 
                                                 
2 For the case code, A1 to A12 refer to interviews with bank analysts, and B1 to B11 to interviews with 
managers in the case institutions. 
3 Previous literature suggests that there appears to be inherent customer inertia in the banking sector; 
that is, even if a customer is dissatisfied with his/her bank, he/she may not change bank in the next year 
(Colgate and Danaher, 2000). 
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relative importance of different intangible elements, the interactions, and bank 
strategies in managing intangibles. Core intangibles tended to vary in different 
business segments. The case institutions, therefore, had to set different strategies in 
response to the variation in the role of intangibles. For example, manager B4 argued 
that service quality was relatively more important in private banking than retail 
banking. Therefore, as a private banking manager, he preferred to allocate more 
resources to human capital aspects than to other intangibles.  
Besides, it was found that the external regulatory climate appeared to be an 
important conditional feature that had bearing upon the role of intangibles. Some 
interviewees discussed the influence of regulations (such as the regulatory response to 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the principle of Treating Customers Fairly4) or 
accounting standards on intangibles. Special conditions for financial institutions, such 
as M&A activity, could also lead to changes in their intangibles strategies. For 
instance, human capital tended to be the core intangible in the M&A context, and the 
interactions between human capital and customer relationships became even more 
critical during the process of integration. 
 
4.3 Interactions 
The core category in the grounded theory of intangibles was the interactions. The 
first level of interactions, namely intra-category interactions, referred to the 
relationships between different concepts that were grouped in the same category. It 
basically involved the relationship between intangible investments and intangible 
resources. Meritum (2002) suggests that different intangibles can be classified into 
intangible resources and intangible activities, according to their static or dynamic 
character. The former can be considered as assets in a broad sense, while the latter are 
activities that might give rise to new intangible resources or improve the value of 
existing ones. The case data revealed that, in practice, banks were concerned about 
not only the critical intangible resources that they had but also the activities that could 
lead to an increase or decrease in these resources. For example, the bank manager in 
                                                 
4 Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) is encapsulated by Principle 6 of the Financial Services Authority’s 
(FSA) 11 Principles for Businesses. TCF aims to balance the customer’s needs with the firm’s needs, 
showing clearly what the firm and its services offer, as well as fees and levels of service (Speech by 
Sam Tymms, 19 May 2006, available at:  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0519_st.shtml,accessed on 2 
February, 2011). 
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interview B5 (see Table 1) pointed out that training investment (employee level HC 
investment) was associated with employee satisfaction (employee level HC resource).  
Intra-category interactions also consisted of relationships among different 
intangible resources in the same category. For example, many interviewees, both 
managers and analysts, emphasised that brands tended to be closely related to 
customer relationships. As manager B11 argued, “the value of the brand is attracting 
customers”. 
Cross-category interactions, as the second level of interactions in the value creation 
process, revealed how different intangible elements interacted with each other across 
the four main IC categories. Many managers and analysts interviewed demonstrated 
that top management HC appeared to lie at the heart of cross-category interactions, as 
it could influence many other types of intangibles (e.g., organisational culture and its 
‘tone’, engagement of lower level managers and employees, customer relationships 
and bank brands). For example, analyst A6 (see Table 1) stated that, 
“[T]he idea from an analyst… is [that] the management will set the tone on 
the culture and a lot of other intangibles, and therefore they are the starting 
point for all of those.” 
 
In addition, cross-category interactions involved how employee level HC and RC 
interacted with each other, and how they combined with SC to contribute to the bank 
value creation process. On the one hand, front line employees or relationship 
managers who had direct contact with customers could affect RC elements such as 
customer satisfaction or customer relationships. On the other hand, RC could also 
affect employee level HC. For example, manager B4 (see Table 1) mentioned that 
their brand strength (RC) could enhance employee emotional capital (employee level 
HC as commitment). Manager B7 provided an example of the interactions among SC, 
employee level HC and RC, as shown in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
More importantly, the case data showed that the interactions across various 
categories of intangibles were complicated, as they were normally interconnected and 
could not create value in isolation. Manager B8 argued that 
“…if I didn’t have the structural capital in place, I wouldn’t be able to afford 
to give customer a good experience… And if I didn’t have good people, they 
wouldn’t invent the structural capital to do that.” 
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The third level of interactions, namely internal bank network interactions, consisted 
of the interactions between intangibles and tangibles, such as the impact of say top 
management human capital on financial intermediation, financial resources and risk 
management mechanisms. Managers in banks recognised there was a two-way 
relationship between intangibles and tangibles. Tangibles acted as the hygiene or 
necessary factors, which provided the foundation for the bank business model to work. 
As manager B5 stressed, ‘playing a brand card’ can produce significant incremental 
revenue or profitability only if the products or services are at least at certain hygiene 
level. 
Simultaneously, intangibles interacted with tangibles and financial resources during 
the process of internal bank network interactions, and influenced financial 
intermediation activities and risk management. They provided the means to reduce 
transaction costs, to make the intermediation process and risk management more 
effective, and also to optimise the deposit or loan portfolio. Specifically, on the 
liability side of the balance sheet, intangibles, such as brand strength and customer 
emotional capital, played a critical role in attracting deposits, especially during the 
financial crisis. On the asset side of the balance sheet, relational capital could 
influence lending activity and the selling of other products. Moreover, in line with 
prior research (e.g., Holland, 2010), the case interviews provided evidence of the 
importance of intangibles in reducing transaction costs and improving risk 
management, such as reducing deposit withdrawal risk and controlling bad debt risk. 
For example, manager B8 explained how their brand strength (relational capital) 
helped them to reduce the cost per account (i.e., the cost for them to get a new 
customer), while manager B1 noted that employee level HC, particularly experienced 
agents, had the ability to better control cost, bad debt risk and manage their customer 
base than new agents. 
The interactions discussed above lie at the heart of the grounded theory, and the 
combination of them leads to the consequences, which is discussed in the next 
subsection.  
 
4.4 Consequences 
The consequences of interactions were related to both bank performance and 
information disclosure in the external market. The discussion of network interactions 
has clearly offered illustrations of the first consequence. It can be seen that the 
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interactions of intangible strengths and other types of resources could lead to an 
increase in deposits or loans and a reduction in cost and risk, and these could result in 
better institutional performance. Improved performance could come from individual 
intangible strengths. For example, a high level of management skills or customer 
recommendation score could be directly associated with better bank performance. 
Most importantly, however, the combined effects of different intangible resources and 
other types of resources were more significant than individual intangible strengths. In 
this manner, the three levels of interactions should be jointly managed and exploited 
to maximise their impact on firm performance.  It is the role of top management to 
develop a coherent strategy to identify the appropriate combination of different types 
of key resources in order to deliver superior performance.  
The second consequence, that is, the intangible disclosure to the information market, 
is discussed in the next subsection. 
 
4.5 Understanding IC based intangibles from managers’ and analysts’ perspectives 
– A view from the ‘market for information’ 
The empirical results also showed that the managers and analysts interviewed 
presented different views on general ideas related to intangibles, including the 
definition of intangibles, the importance of intangibles to bank business success and 
the key intangible elements or indicators. As a result, the internal management and 
external observers (bank analysts) had different views on the dominant intangibles 
and processes outlined in the grounded theory and on bank (and analyst) disclosure of 
IC based information to the external world. 
Managers interviewed were more likely to be comfortable with the definition and 
classification of intangibles in academic research than analysts. Managers perceived 
intangibles to be a broad concept that included not only the accounting number of 
goodwill and other intangible assets on the balance sheet but also other non-financial 
items, while many analysts appeared to focus mainly on the former when they talked 
about the term intangibles.  
Almost all the managers interviewed presented the view that intangibles rather than 
tangibles were key sources of competitive advantage for their institutions. The 
analysts’ views on the importance of intangibles, however, appeared to differ from 
managers’. It is found that although analysts acknowledged the significance of 
intangibles in wealth creation, they prioritised tangible or financial strengths rather 
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than intangibles in contributing to superior bank performance, especially during the 
financial crisis. The reasons for these differences were presumed to be related to the 
different tasks and organisational social context of these actors and are discussed in 
Section 5.3 on implications.  
A difference was also observed in views of the key intangible elements. Interviews 
with managers showed that most of the case institutions had relative strengths in some 
intangibles over others. Some managers highlighted the importance of balancing or 
combining different types of intangibles, although at the same time they paid more 
attention to the intangible elements in which they had relative strengths compared 
with rivals. For example, on the one hand, manager B8 pointed out that culture was 
the No.1 intangibles for them as the culture in their bank was “unique” from peer 
group. On the other hand, he highlighted that, 
“I think it’s a combination of all three [human capital, structural capital and 
relational capital]. …I don’t believe in those companies that only focus on 
relational capital, because it is very nice to have very loyal customers, but if 
your business model is too expensive, you can’t make money. …you have to do 
all three, clearly.” 
 
Others emphasised the specific intangible strengths they had or their critical 
intangible items at the time of the financial crisis. It should be pointed out that apart 
from intangible strengths that have been developed historically, some specific 
intangible elements (e.g., customer relationships, brands and HC) became relatively 
more important due to the change in economic environment, in particular the financial 
crisis.  
In contrast to the view of managers, the majority of analysts interviewed indicated 
that goodwill on the balance sheet and top management HC were the most important 
intangible elements for banks. For example, analyst A3 argued that apart from 
goodwill, “the management is the only area what people think is valuable source of 
intangibles within a bank”. One possible reason of prioritization of goodwill and top 
management quality by analysts may be that they had better access to these two types 
of intangibles compared with other intangible elements. Bank managers are closer to 
bank intangibles than analysts, and thus they may understand the importance of the 
broad set of intangibles better than analysts.  
Limited access to intangible information tended to narrow analysts’ understandings 
of intangibles, reflecting Holland and Johanson’s (2003) view of communication 
barriers. However, consistent with Abhayawansa and Abeysekera (2009), 
 19 
Abhayawansa and Guthrie (2012), Henningsson (2009) and Holland et al. (2012) (but 
inconsistent with the findings of Campbell and Slack (2008)), we found that 
intangibles were important to the analysts interviewed. However, there appeared to be 
a difference between bank analysts’ public reports and their private thinking. Even if 
analysts could not put information about intangibles in their public reports, they 
thought about it privately and commented on it when they communicated with their 
clients.  
There were also important differences between bank disclosure activity and 
analysts’ views of this disclosure. We found that there was a communication gap 
between sell-side analysts, who were considered one of the primary users of 
accounting information, and managers, who acted as providers of intangible 
information. Such a situation is illustrated by Figure 3. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Figure 3 shows that managers in the case institutions tended to provide forward-
looking explanations of the value creation process by using information about 
intangibles, while analysts looked at intangibles through a reverse attribution or 
inference of financial performance (FP) to intangibles.  
The grounded theory of bank intangibles suggested that intangibles were linked 
resources or activities, and measures of them were expected to reflect the inherent 
dimensions and properties of value creation factors or intangible elements. However, 
the case data showed that because intangibles had a highly subjective, socially 
constructed dimension, measuring them quantitatively was difficult. In addition, some 
managers (e.g., manager B2) argued that it was risky to quantitatively measure 
intangibles because there was a danger that the quantitative numbers might not 
appropriately capture the inherent dimensions of intangibles, and hence might fail to 
facilitate management decision-making. 
The case institutions were generally advanced in measuring their key intangibles, 
and some of them have developed systematic measurement frameworks, normally the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC). Nevertheless, many intangibles were still evaluated in 
qualitative terms rather than in numbers, and most of the case institutions were in the 
process of describing distinct intangible elements, but paid little attention to 
measuring the outcomes of them. 
 Because of these difficulties with intangible measurement, most of the disclosed 
intangible information in the market is in qualitative manner. However, analysts 
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expressed an increasing need for quantitative information about intangibles and the 
linkage between them and institution financial performance. These kinds of 
information were valuable for them to explain or predict the value creation process 
and crucial factors that create superior financial performance in banks. For example, 
analyst A 10 expressed a keen interest in intangibles “if I can see a monetary issue 
attached with it and a way to prove it”. 
Analysts prefer to present themselves publically as logical, numerate, and 
‘scientific’. They prefer to disclose less ‘soft’ information, and less difficult to 
measure company IC information in their public reports. This bias and impression 
management corresponds to research by Chan et al., (2007); Mehran and Stulz, (2007), 
Abhayawansa and Abeysekera (2009), and Abhayawansa and Guthrie (2012). 
However, they may use private access to companies to acquire new information on 
company IC (e.g., private meetings with bank managers and managers’ track records), 
especially outlier information that deviates from the consensus. They may use this to 
report in private to clients such as fund managers, to trade on their own behalf (in 
investment bank parents) or to trade information with competitor companies. Thus, 
analysts can ‘present’ or ‘perform’ (Mackenzie and Millo, 2003) one idea of company 
IC in public and another in private. Both have wider impacts in the information 
market networks through exchange mechanisms. 
Given the fact that the bank managers did not reach the stage of fully matching 
intangible measures with their value creation story, the analysts had to use not only 
intangible information but also their experiences over time to explain the value 
creation process or predict bank value. As analyst A6 said,  
“…one of the things I’d like to do is to look at the change of return on assets 
over five years or ten years, and then to see which bank management is adding 
the most value. Now in a way that’s tangible, but … you have to assume that 
there are intangible elements driving [it].”  
                  
 Moreover, managers appeared to be reluctant to report detailed information about 
intangibles, and this seemed to further deepen the communication gap between them 
and analysts. Intangibles were key sources of competitive advantage, and information 
about them was commercially sensitive for the case institutions. Many interviewees 
also expressed concerns regarding the reliability, auditability and comparability of 
intangible measures that they used. Analysts found that it was difficult for them to get 
reliable information about intangibles to assist in their bank valuation.  
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Therefore, it can be seen that appropriate intangible measurement, management and 
disclosure are not only critical for bank managers, but also very important for 
observers such as analysts in the financial markets. In the next section, these 
measurement, communication and disclosure problems and differences between 
bankers and analysts are discussed relative to Henningsson’s (2009) view that external 
observers such as analysts and fund managers are ‘cultured observers’ of companies 
(such as banks) and their IC information.  
 
5. Theoretical discussion and implications of the paper   
This section explores implications of the research for improving bank business 
models and theoretical models. It also considers the wider system implications of such 
improvements for wider external understanding of bank models by observers such as 
analysts and for this to potentially reduce systemic risk possibilities. 
 
5.1 Implications for understanding banks and improving their business models 
The empirical significance of the grounded theory research is it provides a means to 
search for ways to rethink bank business models. At the bank level, the grounded 
theory shows that an appropriate combination of knowledge based intangibles and 
tangibles allows a bank to create value, inter alia, by reducing transaction costs, 
optimising its deposit and loan portfolio, and improving the intermediation process 
and risk management. Therefore, bank managers should be able to develop their 
business model by balancing different types of resources and exploiting their linkages 
rather than focusing on the development of individual resources. Moreover, as the 
value creation model is adjusted under various conditions, top management in banks, 
therefore, are expected to continue to learn from the interactions of intangibles and 
tangibles. This creates opportunities to identify and develop key sources of 
competitive advantage in their bank, and thereby set up a coherent strategy to search 
for a robust combination of intangibles and tangibles in response to conditional 
changes (Holland, 2010).  
Both bank and analyst interviewees argued that in order to manage intangibles 
more effectively, bank managers should develop appropriate intangible measurements. 
However, measurement alone is not enough. The interviewees recognised that 
improving the overall portfolio of information sources and their interactions were 
critical to the quality of their decisions. Improvement in quantitative measures, along 
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with qualitative measures, were required to improve the overall information supply 
and to create a more effective dialogue and argument within management teams (and 
analyst teams) for more effective internal decision making. 
It was found that the case institutions can be divided into three groups with regard 
to their intangible measurement and evaluation experience, as shown in Figure 4. The 
first group in the sample has developed quantitative metrics for most of the key 
intangible elements across all categories of intangibles, and has also started to conduct 
internal statistical analyses to examine the interactions among intangibles. The second 
group of banks has a mature measurement framework in place. They have developed 
quantitative metrics for some intangible elements, but paid little attention to the 
interactions among metrics. Finally, managers who just talked about some intangible 
metrics and the measurement tools they used rather than systematically discussing 
their measurement systems were placed into the third group.  
Insert Figure 4 about here 
The three groups offer an example of how banks may vary in their management, 
measurement and qualitative evaluation of intangibles in their value creation process 
and business models. This variation may reflect differing views and uncertainty about 
the relative merits of measurement versus subjective evaluation in this area and about 
the nature of an optimal information system.  
 
5.2 Implications for banks’ theoretical models 
The theoretical significance of the empirical insights in this paper is that they 
support development beyond conventional theoretical views where banks are 
interpreted as financial intermediaries that exist relative to markets because they 
reduce agency costs and transaction costs (Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2003).  
 The empirical insights reveal the need to understand ideas of a wider business 
model and the role of knowledge in innovation and competitive advantage, to fully 
understand how banks make their financial intermediation processes more effective 
and competitive. As Scholtens and van Wensveen (2003: 40) note; 
“The contemporary theory of financial intermediation is not well-equipped to 
explain market dynamism… An amended theory is necessary to explain what 
was, is, and remains the essential function of banking and finance, how this 
function leads to new risk products, both for the intermediaries’ own account … 
and new risk products developed by them for the open market.” 
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The new theoretical narrative (Locke, 2001) corresponding to the above empirical 
findings can be briefly summarised as follows. Bank business models (IIRC, 2011) 
have knowledge intensive intangibles (or HC, SC and RC as in Meritum, 2002) that 
are rare, inimitable, difficult to copy sources of value (Barney, 1991). Bank business 
models also include core tangibles (e.g., financial assets, liabilities, technology) and 
tangible processes (e.g., risk management and intermediation, technological). These 
tangibles are common to specific bank models such as retail banking and are easily 
copied. In addition, the knowledge intensive intangibles are at the core of sustainable 
competitive advantage in business models, as noted in the resource based view of the 
firm (Barney, 1991). These integrated and combined intangibles and tangibles form 
bank business models (IIRC 2011) and value creation chains (Porter, 1985), which are 
the basis for banks to conduct risk management and financial intermediation in a more 
effective way than competitors, and this is expected to result in higher financial 
performance. 
For example, the application of new intangibles in banking is expected to stabilise 
expected income, as better knowledge of intangibles, such as knowledge of customers 
and employees, can help banks better manage and forecast their transaction flow. It is 
also expected to improve the risk management and intermediation processes and to 
stabilise supply and demand, and costs and revenues, across market cycles.  
In terms of the conventional narrative of finance theory and financial 
intermediation theory, such knowledge intensive banks provide the means to reduce 
agency costs and associated problems of information asymmetry, adverse selection 
and moral hazard. However, the empirical results reveal that the bank’s primary aim 
was value creation. Reduction of agency costs and transaction costs was achieved as 
by-products of the main value creation purpose and activity, as suggested by 
Scholtens and van Wensween (2003). Thus, conventional finance and intermediation 
theory by themselves are inappropriate to explain the primary function, purpose, and 
behaviour of banks. They cannot explain the value creation process, the change 
process in banks, and emergence of new products and new transacting means. But 
these finance theory sources are important to explain the relationship between 
financial firms and markets once such change has occurred. Thus, current research 
requires both the established theory narrative and the new theory narrative to be 
connected in a coherent way in a much broader theoretical narrative.  
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The paper can also be used to generate new theoretically based hypotheses for 
further research. For example, banks with the same tangibles (such as financial assets 
and liabilities) and same tangible processes (such as risk management and 
intermediation), but with intangibles with higher knowledge and sustainable 
competitive advantages (SCA), will be expected to have higher performance, and vice 
versa. The discussion of measurement and proxy issues in section 4 provides ideas on 
how to operationalize such hypotheses. 
This paper has revealed the potential for developing theoretical models and 
generating new hypotheses by using empirical findings in the form of grounded 
theory and IC literature and combining them with conventional financial concepts of 
banks. Such theoretical development is required to support governments and 
regulators when demanding banks’ careful management of bank IC in their bank 
models, to reduce individual bank risk and the likelihood of future crises. 
 
5.3 Theoretical discussion and systems implications for understanding bank models 
In the grounded theory, interactions and transformations occurred at many bank 
levels, and were not simple cause and effect relations between specific elements and 
performance, but reflected a complex interacting system. These complex interactions 
reflect a wider discussion in the literature (e.g., Cuganesan, 2005; Holland, 2004; 
Johanson et al., 2001; Murthy and Mouritsen, 2011). This view extends the theoretical 
narrative of the previous section. 
 
Interpreting the ‘market for information’ and social systems contexts 
The empirical observations can be interpreted from a systems perspective at bank 
organisational level. In Weick’s terms (1979, 1995) bank organizing was a system of 
individual, team and organizational contexts, processes and behaviours (internal and 
external). In the case banks these included the bank knowledge intensive intangibles 
at firm (SC and RC) and team and individual levels (HC), and their interactions with 
each other and with tangible assets (financial, technology, etc.) and tangible decision 
processes (risk management, intermediation, etc.). These resources were integrated by 
the wider organisation system, the business model, and value creation aims around the 
concept of creating a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  
This systems approach can be further developed by noting that the bank 
organisation is a sub-set of a larger social and market system and actively interacts 
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with this larger system. In particular, we note that the case banks were actively 
involved in the communication (disclosure) of information (on bank business models 
and value creation processes) to markets and in the analysis of this information by 
market actors. This ‘market for information’ can be conceived of as the institutional 
means to connect corporate (bank) information supply activities to security market 
information demand activities (Keane, 1983). According to actor-network theory 
(Latour, 1987, 1993), the market consists of an alliance of actors (i.e., people and 
firms, such as bank managers, analysts and fund managers) who are involved in the 
invention, construction, distribution, performance and usage of information about 
companies such as banks. Major interactions or interrelations arise between people 
and other elements, such as in bank value creation processes, information production 
and exchange processes, and regular transactions between parties. Bank managers and 
analysts operate at the heart of this market. The external networks are important parts 
of social systems and means by which ‘social forces’ operate on these actors.  
Holland et al. (2012) argue that ideas from ‘sociology of finance’ can be used to 
interpret the wider social context. For example, Henningsson (2009), using Luhmann 
(1995) and Fuchs (2001), has argued that people are a part of many different social 
systems and are therefore influenced by different logics. He proposes that fund 
managers and others create their own collective stories of different firms (such as 
banks) as well as of the functioning of the financial market. These stories evolve as a 
result of experience but are also strongly affected by social forces (Fuchs, 2001; 
Luhmann, 1995), and guide actors in the market for information, and stock and bond 
markets when they interpret (bank) information. In this way banks, analysts, fund 
managers, customers and others become limited by their own social blindness and 
knowledge creation may be blocked which makes it hard to understand new emerging 
phenomena like new IC use in changing business models in banks (Holland, 2010). 
As a result, differential knowledge creation and states can occur across these actors 
and banking firms due to such barriers.  
A key social force in forming (and mis(in)forming) bank and other financial actors’ 
ideas has been ‘performativity’. Performativity has many aspects and includes 
situations where theoretical models become tools used by market actors, where this 
can modify economic processes, and whereby these processes become more like the 
theoretical models (Mackenzie, 2006). Performativity pressures are at work in the 
‘market for information’ and stock markets. Ideas grounded in financial theory, about 
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efficient markets, rational agents and information asymmetry, and asset pricing have 
dominated thinking about such markets, and about their ‘efficiency’ in assimilating 
information, in risk pricing and the valuation of companies such as banks. Bank 
dominated market processes became larger and much more active as a result of these 
theoretical views (Turner, 2009; Holland, 2010). Actors in these markets have 
operated on the assumptions in these theories or by their performative aspect, as noted 
by Vollmer et al. (2009). This in contrast to the non-use or ignorance of established 
and empirically tested risk management and intermediation concepts by failing 
bankers during the 2007 crisis (Holland, 2010). 
We can also note that issues of ‘culture’ play a role in the social forces in financial 
networks, in communication problems and in resistance to change. Differences 
between a company’s culture and that of the financial market has been identified as a 
cause of communication difficulties between them (Holland and Johanson, 2003; 
Henningsson, 2009). Banks and other financial firms have in part, ‘overcome’ these 
problems in information and stock markets by use of social or relational capital such 
as reputation in selected sub-networks of these markets (Holland, 2005, 2006). The 
uncritical performativity aspect of established theories has combined with social or 
reputational variables to create a climate of confidence in markets and bank 
participants to allow active transacting and communications to occur. 
 
Illustration of social forces 
The role of the social context on bank IC information disclosure, and on analysts’ 
use of this information, and their dependence on the social system within which they 
are operating, can be illustrated by several examples from the empirical findings from 
this study.  
As discussed in section 4, measurement and communication problems and 
differences between bankers and analysts were noted. These correspond to 
Henningsson’s (2009) view that external observers such as analysts and fund 
managers are ‘cultured observers’ of companies (such as banks) and their IC 
information. They are influenced by social forces when they observe IC information. 
Social logics about their own host firm, the market price, and the agenda around 
certain banks, play a role in the subjective and social construction of ideas and 
information about bank IC. Managers in banks can also be seen as ‘cultured 
observers’ of their own value creation and disclosure processes, and of the external 
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processes of analysts and fund managers (such as analysis, action, and bank reputation 
construction). Differences in these social logics (for managers in the bank, and for sell 
side analysts) and in the nature of their aims, specialist tasks and decision processes 
play a role in the differing viewpoints about business models, measurement, links to 
performance outcomes and communication gaps.  
These social forces and the other factors above also played a role in their differing 
views on the problems of quantitative measurement of intangibles and preferences for 
qualitative measures. Managers were closer to the IC and value creation phenomena 
and thus in a privileged position to assess the credibility of such measures and their 
role in decision making. Analysts operated in an external world where they had to 
demonstrate analytic and numeric skills and could not risk their reputation here. They 
have wealth and information access incentives to bias their own IC and numerical 
disclosure outputs to match client and relationship company needs and to maintain 
their reputation. This bias and impression management corresponds to research by 
Chan et al. (2007), Mehran and Stulz (2007), Abhayawansa and Abeysekera (2009), 
and Abhayawansa and Guthrie (2012). This behaviour may be best controlled through 
improvements in bank modelling and enhanced bank disclosure of IC information. It 
was not clear from the data how these factors interacted to influence measurement, 
links to performance outcomes, and disclosure, and this must be the focus of further 
research. However, Figure 3 illustrates that the processes were distinct and led to 
different behaviours and outcomes.  
This paper also indicates that analysts compensated for some of the problems of 
using and making sense of bank IC information, by conducting their analyses within 
wider information market contexts and processes. Their analyses of bank IC and its 
role in the bank’s value creation process occurred in related contexts of each analyst’s 
own personal knowledge, skills and capabilities, as well as the IC of the analyst’s firm. 
Their analyses and sense making also occurred in the wider professional network 
context of many analysts and their shared knowledge, consensus analysis/forecast for 
banks, incentives for disclosure and analyst rankings. Finally, it also occurred within a 
wider information network of many other information-production professionals, and 
many information users. The dynamic character of this information market network 
was demonstrated by everyday interactions. It was also shown by learning and change 
in the bank, driving learning by the analysts (and by implication by others in the 
network) about bank IC and its changing role in bank value creation and value. Banks 
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also compensated for some of the problems of disclosing IC information by 
conducting disclosure in such wider social systems of in public and private networks 
(Holland, 2005). 
 
Improving network actor understanding of bank business models 
The above are examples of Henningsson’s (2009) argument that social groups in 
the world of finance, including bank management, bank analysts and investors, 
develop and are constrained by their own social environments, collective ideas and 
opinions that are stable and hard to change over time.  
This paper argues that improvements in bank business models and a broader and 
matching dynamic theory narrative of banks and market, as discussed in the previous 
section, are a part of the solution to such problems. The creation of common and 
public knowledge about bank models, the role of IC, how banks change over time, 
how their models are empirically tested, and the creation of new bank theory closely 
matched to this phenomenon, may be one of the means to bring together these 
different social systems and their shared and differing perceptions, social logics and 
understandings of the core functions and roles of banks and markets. These are partial 
means to reduce the shared social blindness and untested narratives concerning new 
bank IC and business models. They are also partial means to ensure that collective 
stories are more grounded than those used in the recent past and more open to 
collective and explicit criticism and debate. This is the basis for a more ‘reflexive 
performativity’ based on theoretical models and empirical results that more fully 
reflect economic phenomena rather than creating them. ‘Reflexive performativity’ is 
interpreted as including situations where new and empirically tested theoretical 
models and literature (of, for example, intellectual capital and bank value creation) 
become tools used by many market actors (e.g., bank analysts) and where this can be 
used to modify (information market and stock) market processes in a more open, and 
public manner. The danger here is that the new theoretical and empirical narrative 
could again create new conditions of unthinking or convenient ‘performativity’ at 
some point in the future. Hence, a more critical and sceptical stance is required to the 
narrative. This may best be secured by a wider understanding of the social systems 
theory and ideas of ‘performativity’ discussed here. This requires a further extension 
to the theoretical narrative to include these ideas to create a more critical and reflexive 
‘performativity’. Thus, the development of bank models within an awareness of social 
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forces and logics is required. This is required of business models and theoretical 
models. In the latter case those historic models derived from academic generated 
theory and literature, have proved to be the source of dogmatism and contributed to 
systemic risk (Turner, 2009). The approach developed in this paper is one possible 
way to ensure that the social forces, noted by Henningsson (2009) affect the behavior 
and actions of finance network actors (especially academics and practitioners) in more 
informed, critical and publicly open manner. Cultural barriers to communication 
could be reduced by such wider shared understandings. This provides an opportunity 
to improve awareness of social systems and their implications for finance both 
amongst academics and practitioners. 
In more practical terms, new bank models would be a new basis for improving the 
public and private interpretation and discussion of bank risks and performance. There 
is also a need for banks to disclose more information about intangibles. Improving the 
interpretive model and its information requirements is necessary for analysts, fund 
managers and other actors (e.g., bank rating agencies), and for wider processes in the 
market for information. For example, Beattie and Thomson (2010) have conducted a 
study of intellectual capital reporting, and raised several questions regarding IC 
disclosure, such as whether meaningful and effective regulation is desirable, and at 
what level it should operate. They argue that there is an opportunity to “investigate 
whether a set of industry-specific standardised metrics can be developed and their 
disclosure regulated” (Beattie and Thomson, 2010: 140). This paper shows that there 
appears to be a need for bank industry-specific reporting standards or guidelines from 
both internal managers’ and external analysts’ perspectives and from wider 
information market perspectives. Appropriate standards, based on explicit bank 
models (business and theoretical) for each major bank type and its specialised use of 
IC, could encourage banks to disclose more and consistent intangible metrics and 
reduce the problem of information manipulation, thereby provide reliable and 
comparable information to analysts for bank valuation.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides a new way of rethinking banking models by using qualitative 
research on intangibles. Based on interviews with bank managers and analysts, a 
grounded theory of bank intangibles is generated, revealing how intangibles and 
tangible/financial resources interact in the bank value creation process and actively 
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respond to environmental changes. An appropriate combination and interaction of 
intangibles and tangible/financial resources provides the means to improve the 
processes of financial intermediation, information intermediation and risk 
management in banks. This grounded theory offers a novel insight into the banking 
business model and draws the attention to the increasingly important role that 
intangibles play in it. It suggests that existing bank business models should be further 
developed in a conceptually richer world of intangibles, knowledge and information.  
The paper also offers opportunities for theoretical development. Compared with the 
extant banking literature that focuses heavily on tangible or financial resources, this 
paper shows how issues of knowledge and capabilities in banks and bankers can be 
related to conventional theoretical ideas in banking, such as intermediation, 
information problems and risk management. It suggests that the conventional 
information dimensions to these theoretical ideas can be expanded by including ideas 
of knowledge-based intangibles in banking from the IC literature. Moreover, the 
grounded theory generated here provides a means to improve intangible measurement 
and disclosure, which provides an opportunity for academic researchers to further 
investigate the role of intangibles in the value creation process using quantitative 
techniques.  
Furthermore, this paper argues that social systems theory and concepts of 
‘performativity’ are relevant to understanding the wider context. The creation of 
common and public knowledge about bank business models, and the creation of new 
bank theory closely matched to this phenomenon may be one of the means to bring 
together different social systems and their shared and differing social logics and 
understandings of banks and markets. If this is combined with a systems perspective 
by these bank and network actors, this is the basis for a more ‘critical and reflexive 
performativity’ based on theoretical models and empirical results that more fully 
reflect economic phenomena rather than creating them. Practitioners can develop new 
business models which are based on their own learning and strategic aims. They can 
also consider developing them in the context of empirical field research on business 
models (or grounded theory), new matching theoretical developments, and an 
understanding of the impact of social forces and logics on their understandings and 
actions. 
This is related to Hopwood’s (2009) editorial in Accounting, Organization and 
Society where he argued for more critical studies of financial markets. Vollmer et al. 
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(2009) in the same issue suggested that a closer engagement with sociology would 
benefit not only studies of behaviour in financial markets but also studies in 
accounting.  
There is a need for further studies of IC, addressing corporate IC value creation, 
business and theory models, disclosure practise as well as information market 
behaviour. However, we would argue that the present explorative study on banks 
supports the proposal that further studies of IC would gain from exploiting recent 
developments in the sociology of finance, in particular concepts of organisational and 
social systems, performativity and cultural barriers, in interpreting their results. 
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Table 1: Examples of interactions 
 
 Case ref. Concepts and interactions 
Intra-
category 
interactions 
B3, B8 Training investment (employee level HC investment) → 
Employee satisfaction or loyalty (employee level HC 
resource) 
 
B11 IT investment (SC investment) → Improved internal system 
(SC resource) 
 
B7, A11 Marketing expenditures (RC investment) → Customer 
relationships (RC resource) 
 
B8, B11, 
A10 
Brand strength (RC resource) → Customer relationships (RC 
resource) 
 
Cross-
category 
interactions 
B10, A1, A6 Top management HC → Organisational culture (RC) 
A4, B2 Top management HC → Customers’ confidence with the 
bank (RC) 
 
B1, B4, B5, 
B7, B9 
Employee retention or employee quality (employee level HC) 
→ Customer satisfaction or relationships (RC) 
 
B4, B7 Brand strength (RC) → Employee engagement (employee 
level HC) 
 
B1, B7 Internal supporting system (SC) → Employee retention 
(employee level HC) 
 
Internal 
bank firm 
network 
interactions 
A4, A7 Brand strength (RC) → Taking deposits (financial 
intermediation process)  
 
B3, A1, A2 Cross-selling (RC) → Increasing loans (financial 
intermediation process) 
 
A2, A11 Brand strength (RC) → Lower cost of deposits (financial 
intermediation process) 
 
B1, B6, B8 Customer relationships (RC) → Reduction of costs (financial 
intermediation process) 
 
B2 Customer confidence with the bank (RC) → Reduction of 
deposit withdrawal risk (risk management) 
 
A6, B4 Top management HC → Risk management 
 
Notes: A1 to A12 refer to interviews with bank analysts, and B1 to B11 refer to interviews with 
managers in financial institutions. HC refers to human capital, SC to structural capital and RC to 
relational capital. 
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Figure 1: The grounded theory of bank intangibles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: HC refers to human capital, SC to structural capital and RC to relational capital. 
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Figure 2: An example of cross-category interactions 
 
Notes: HC refers to human capital, SC to structural capital and RC to relational capital. 
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Figure 3: The processes of intangible measurement and disclosure from 
managers’ and analysts’ perspectives 
 
Notes: VC refers to value creation, FP to financial performance and BSC to the Balanced Scorecard. 
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Figure 4: Intangible measurements in the case institutions 
 
 
Notes: Manager B2 and managers in interview B6 worked in the same bank but in different positions, 
and managers B7 and B9 worked in the same bank but in different business segments. 
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